TERRORISM -CRIMINAL ACT OR ACT OF WAR
The 2 1 ' ' century presents many challenges to the future security of the United States.
The collapse of the Soviet Union triggered unprecedented change in the balance of power throughout the world. Globalization, failed states, states in transition to democracy, as well as other changes are having both positive and negative effects. As the sole superpower, the United States tends to be the beneficiary of the positive and often is blamed for much of the negative and as such the likelihood of terrorism directed at the United States is increasing.
Seen as the only way to deal with the power and influence of the United States, our opponents mean to challenge us asymmetrically using terrorism as a weapon to wage war.' Perhaps most troubling, is that the threat is growing more complex and more lethal. Transnational organizations, such as Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda based in Afghanistan, are examples of this complexity. Determining a linkage between these organizations and a state is difficult.
Consequently, forming and directing a response that strikes a balance between the rule of law and our national security is equally more difficult. Add to this continuing advances in technology, the free flow of information, the Internet, and recent terrorist trends and it all points to an undeniable fact -the threat of a catastrophic terrorist attack against the United States is a clear and present danger.2 These threats have been laid out in our National Security Strategy and recognized in numerous studies looking at national security challenges in the 21' ' century.
Meeting these challenges requires relooking how we will respond to these acts. Acts that arguably could be considered acts of war. Ideally we hope to deter attack, but failing that the US must be able to move quickly and decisively to detect and preempt an attack and if all else fails to retaliate to discourage and prevent further attack. We must do all this without shying from our national interests, jeopardizing our position among the nations of the world, or eroding the freedoms we enjoy at home. This paper will look at legal and doctrinal considerations impacting our response to terrorism and determine whether we should consider terrorism an act of war or a criminal act. The paper will also address the national security implications of this determination. It is commonly accepted that terrorist fall into three categories: Criminals, Crusaders, or crazies3 This is in keeping with the current joint definition of terrorism. For the purpose of this study I will look only at threat situations against the US presented by crusaders -those with a political, religious, or ideological m~t i v e .~ THESIS This paper will show that there is no one logical determination for classifying all acts of terrorism, as solely either acts of war or criminal acts. In light of the predicted terrorist threat significant enough to threaten the survival of the nation (catastrophic terror), this determination is less a legal or academic exercise and more practically one based on how such a determination governs the paradigm (law enforcement or national security) we use to respond to the threat. More important is how that response protects our nation's interests and our status in the world community. Catastrophic terror makes relying solely on a law enforcement response a dangerous decision. Yet reflecting on the changing strategic environment, an act of war determination in a legal classical sense is equally impractical. This paper will further show that a new determination carrying the same weight as an act of war must be developed and accepted domestically and internationally to provide legal response options offering greater latitude to law enforcement and national security forces. This latitude will provide the means to better meet threats to national security in the 2 1 ' ' century.
BACKGROUND STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
"We are entering a new American century in which we will become still wealthier and culturally more lethal and increasingly powerful. We will excite hatred without precedent. "5 This prediction by author Ralph Peters may be a bit overstated, but the root message is valid nonetheless. After the fall of the Soviet Union many predicted a period of peace. Instead the advent of a new world order, a catalyst for unprecedented change, has triggered a great deal of instability as the people and nations of the world adjust to dynamic shifts in environment.
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the breakup of the Soviet Union the world has been subjected to a number of significant shifts in the strategic environment. The vacuum of power caused by the collapse of the Warsaw Pact is being filled in part by the United States and our allies. Yet, this vacuum also produced a rash of failed states and regional conflicts and tensions such as Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Chechnya. The failure of communism and the subsequent transition by many states to democracy increased the openness by which the nations of the world conduct business. Globalization, fueled by this openness and leveraged by technology and the Internet, has blurred the lines between nations and cultures. While beneficial to many, this globalization causes intense pressures on those who feel that their national identities, their religions, and their cultures are at risk. A benefit of globalization is reflected in the increasing prosperity among the countries of the developed world. Conversely this prosperity is widening the gap between the rich developed countries and the countries and peoples of the developing third world6 The new world order is marked by dynamic and often volatile shifts in power -military, political, economic, informational, and cultural. The United States the sole remaining superpower is squarely in the middle of these shifts.
While well intended, the shaping pillar of our national security strategy puts the United States on the back of these dynamic shifts of power as we try with our allies to maintain stability, promote democracy, and foster free trade.7 Despite our sincere intentions and the goodwill we export, our methods, our position, and our power produce enemies as well. The terrorist threat of the 21' ' century is in transition. While the numbers of terrorist attacks have decreased over the last decade, the nature of terror organizations and the lethality of the weapons in their arsenals or within their grasp should give the United States pause."
Terror organizations have become increasingly transnational in nature. They are simple, flat, and highly networked. These terror groups, working as surrogates of states or executing operations in their own interest, are responding to the power of the United States asymmetrically and seem to be less constrained in the use of force. Their feeling of helplessness in dealing with the threat they perceive from us coupled with the knowledge of the consequences of taking credit for an attack raise the level of hatred in our enemies and consequently increase the likelihood of catastrophic attack. General Hugh Shelton, the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, referring to U.S. antiterrorist operations launched against the Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda after the embassy bombings in Africa put it this way -We are in a different ball game today.
The dynamics of the changing world order are a catalyst for transnational terrorist that have little or no ties to any state. These same dynamics have also produced a growing number of areas such as failed states, which provide breeding grounds and safe haven for these transnational groups. Transnational terror organizations are loosely affiliated; members often do not consider themselves a citizen of any particular country. Unlike traditional state sponsored groups such as many of the Palestinian terror organizations, transnational groups tend to defy clas~ification.'~ France's leading terror expert, Xavier Raufer, put it this way. "At any given time, you can take a picture of the worldwide Islamic terrorist infrastructure -but two hours later, the entire constellation will appear radically different."14
Probably the most disturbing factor in this equation is not the increased likelihood of attack on the US, not the difficulties presented by terror as a form of asymmetric attack, nor the difficulties in dealing with highly networked transnational terror groups. It is the growing tendency toward, and the ability to execute, terror at a more lethal level -Catastrophic terrorism.
Catastrophic Terrorism is that form of terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction, cyber attack, or I believe a concerted series of smaller conventional terror attacks that severely threaten the stability and even the very existence of our government, our key institutions, and our ability to protect and further our national interests.15 In the past crusaders used a form of constrained terror. Incidents were designed to gain enough attention and hopefully public support for a cause. Certainly mass casualties or even significant material damage would jeopardize that public support. An attack's primary effect was to gain media attention to focus the world on the plight of a group and hopefully to impact world leaders to influence future events in their favor. The attacks on Khobar Towers, our embassies in Africa, the Murrah 
RESPONSE SPECTRUM
Any good business conducts a risk analysis to determine its optimum response to risk.
Two fundamemtal elements of a risk analysis is to determine the probability of an event occurring and the likely loss should it occur. In addressing the strategic environment we looked at catastrophic terrorism and our vulnerability to it. Our response to the threat runs across a spectrum consisting of 5 areas: deter, detect, preempt, crisis response, and consequence
management.lg
This study has no metrics to determine the precise likelihood of catastrophic terrorist attack against the US nor any scientific evidence on the gravity of such an attack should it happen. What we do have are terrorist experts and national security officials saying that these attacks will happen. The likely loss from such an attack is astronomical. In the past our efforts to fight terrorism focused on the traditional, constrained terrorism. Although there were efforts in all areas of the response spectrum addressed above, the focus was on self-insurance -when it happens we'll react. The stakes are now much too high and therefore we must focus greater attention on deterring, detecting, and preempting these acts of terror.20
DOCTRINE AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF TERRORISM
The purpose of this section is to provide the reader with background on definitions, doctrine, agreements, treaties, laws, and policies and procedures key to understanding legal options available to the United States in responding to the threat of terrorism and in determining if a given terrorist act should be considered an act of war or a criminal act. would and should continue to consider these terrorist acts unlawful. Although these definitions reflect a strong tendency to consider all acts of terror as criminal acts, this does not rule out the possibility that a given act of terrorism in a larger sense could be determined an act of war.
TERRORISM DEFINITIONS
After all many terrorist acts committed during the course of war would be violations of the laws of war and considered war crimes2*
TERRORISM DOCTRINE AND POLICY
~al: The 1999 National Security Strategy strongly addre Nation es the terrorist threat throughout the document. President Clinton mentions it in the preface and the conclusion and the strategy clearly identifies terrorism as a threat to the nation's vital interest. In addition it labels it among our most serious threats deserving the highest priority. While it is categorized as a crime, countered whenever possible using law enforcement and diplomatic resources, it does recognize the need to deal with threats using military options and exercising the right to act in self-defense. security. This threat requires our highest attention. The message in our policy and doctrine is that terrorism is a crime, yet we recognize the magnitude of the threat and the potential need to respond with all appropriate instruments of power. While terrorism is a crime, our position leaves open the possibility that a given act of terrorism is also an act of war all be it in an unclassical sense.
DOMESTIC LAW
Changing environments and threats have always resulted in evolving domestic law to deal with changes. This is certainly true in combating terrorism and has been particularly true in The Stafford Act states that it is the policy of the federal government to provide an orderly and continuing means of supplemental assistance to state and local governments in their responsibilities to alleviate the suffering and damage that result from major disasters or emergencies. The Act bolsters the United States' ability to combat terrorists regardless of where they attack.
The provisions provide for clear federal jurisdiction for international terrorist attacks within the US. It also creates a new federal crime for acts of terrorism involving violations ranging from murder to destruction of property. The law would only come into play if the Attorney General certifies two key points related to the offense: 1) The offense transcended national boundaries, and 2) The offense was of a terrorist nature intended to coerce, intimidate, or retaliate against a government or civilian population. This act provides law enforcement greater latitude in pursuing this type of investigation. As an example it eases legal requirements for pretrial confinement and electronic surveillance. The Act also provides for a myriad of other authorizations that tightened the grip on anyone wishing to prosecute a terrorist agenda anywhere in the world." The act focuses on terrorism from a law enforcement paradigm by providing law enforcement greater latitude to fight terrorism as a crime. As such the ACLU and others have raised concerns that this act will erode the rights and protection enjoyed by ~m e r i c a n s .~~ 
INTERNATIONAL LAWS / LAW OF WAR
Throughout history the United States has preferred to fight threats to national security, as far from our homeland as possible and in our recent history we have been effective in doing that. To counter the terrorist threat far from our homeland through viable deterrence and preemption it is important to understand international laws that govern the nature and intensity of our response. The United Nations' Charter, the GenevdHague Conventions, as well as numerous other international treaties and agreements provide guidelines for nations to defend themselves against acts of aggression. Whether an act is viewed within the rule of law as a criminal act or an act of war influences the measures that can be taken. and protection of territorial integrity. The US has not had its territorial integrity and political independence threatened since WWII. Recent history however has seen many uses of the customary right of self-defense to protect our citizens. This justification was used in Grenada, Panama, and in our failed attempt to free the hostages in Iran. Still the most controversial aspect of the right of self-defense is the principle of "anticipatory self-defense". This is the right of a nation to strike in self-defense to thwart an imminent attack. As this concept allows a great deal of subjective latitude to the "threatened state, its use often provokes unfavorable response from other nations. The US strikes against Libya and state sponsored terrorist in 1986 and terrorist elements in Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998 are examples. Our argument at the time was that these strikes were not retaliatory, but executed rather to prevent further imminent attacks. Despite this justification these strikes each met with condemnation from the world community.46
The Law of War as recognized by the U.S. is derived from two sources: the GenevaIHague Conventions and customary law. These conventions and laws cover a wide variety of subjects regarding the conduct of war. A few points as it relates to this paper are instructive. War may be defined as hostilities between two or more States. An outbreak of hostilities is often initiated by a formal declaration of war, although armed conflict can occur without a declaration if sanctioned by the United Nations or e,xercising the right of self-defense against an armed attack. The conventions also cover areas that restrict the legal prosecution of a war such as prohibiting the use of poisons or poisonous weapons or the protections afforded medical personnel, prisoners, and other noncombatant^.^^
Much international law deals with the issue of terrorism through multinational and binational agreements that focus on the misdeed or crime without labeling the incident terrorism.
These laws tend to deal with incidents that the international community can easily agree must be stopped. 
DISCUSSION
This section will address legal and operational aspects of terrorism by first using the law enforcement paradigm (criminal act) and, next using the national security paradigm (act of war).
The section will conclude with a comparison of the two models.
On May 22 1998, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directives 62 and 63
and appointed a national coordinator for security, infrastructure protection, and counter terrorism to the National Security Council. The President marked this event with the comment that the country must fight the new terrorist threats "with the same rigor and determination we applied to the toughest security challenges of this century,"" The very nature of this new form of terrorism is that the threat is no longer exclusively a law enforcement problem with little impact on national security. With no real peer competitor to present a symmetrical threat on the horizon, the new terror threat is now or will certainly grow to be, the most likely and significant threat to our national security for the foreseeable future?' How we prepare to respond to the threat depends on understanding the two response paradigms we currently use to counter the threat and then deal with the question: Do we treat these attacks as acts of war or criminal acts?
TERRORISM AS A CRIMINAL ACT -THE LAW ENFORCEMENT PARADIGM
Determining an act of terror strictly as a criminal act embraces the law enforcement paradigm for forming a response. This paradigm is marked by an investigation process, rules of evidence, constitutional protection, a presumption of innocence, and post facto arrest and To flesh out the pros and cons of the law enforcement paradigm, one must understand the process. The probability of a successful end state -identification and conviction of all responsible, is based 'on a number of factors. Success depends on viable witnesses, finding trace evidence, a cooperative environment, investigative latitude and skill, and productive use of sufficient resources. Trace evidence is often the most conclusive evidence in a trial as it is based on scientific analysis. Ballistics, trace chemicals in explosives, incident reconstruction, document analysis, fingerprints, DNA, and other forensic evidence can provide definitive information to focus an investigation or successfully conclude it outright. Despite the value of forensic evidence, witnesses remain the most irnportant aid in a successful investigation and prosecution. Witnesses assist in identifying evidence, suspects, and other sources of information. Without this cooperation an investigation and prosecution is at best difficult and at worst impossible. The overall environment that investigators work in is also important.
Cooperation among police and judicial agencies and local government offices impacts the progress of any case. Obviously the skill of the forensic scientists, investigators, and prosecutors can have either a negative or positive effect that is difficult to measure, but perhaps more irnportant is the latitude within the law (search and seizure, rules of evidence, burden of proof) that this team has to work with. Finally the more time, money, personnel, and equipment are brought into play the greater the chance of eventually solving the crime and building a successful prosecution.
55
The benefits of the law enforcement paradigm rest in its foundation in the rule of law.
The paradigm provides a measured approach to the problem that follows well-known and commonly accepted police and judicial practices. The separation of the police aspects of the process with the judicial aspect also provides a system of checks and balances largely designed to keep the police in check. A fully successful investigation provides the proof needed to convict all guilty parties. Such successes ensure the continued credibility of the system. More important a successful prosecution inspires confidence in the system, confidence that terrorist will be brought to justice and confidence that our civil liberties will not be eroded in the process.
If we wish not to be seen as capricious or flaunting our power then a fully successful criminal investigation and prosecution as described above is certainly the best solution. A properly executed case provides us the moral high ground. In the eyes of our citizens and the world we are rightly seen as responding to this criminal act in a prudent and civilized manner in keeping with our position as a superpower. The terrorists are brought to justice legitimately and through due process found guilty and punished. The crime is solved and deterrence is served
Of course all investigations are not fully successful and even among those that are they do not always produce the desired impact. A number of factors are particularly problematic in strictly pursuing the law enforcement paradigm in terrorist cases. First, while there is certainly a goal to prevent crime in the first place, and in some cases the circumstances to preempt a crime prior to its commission, the law enforcement paradigm is largely reactive. In domestic law enforcement, issues of rights of privacy and other civil liberties limit law enforcement's ability to look for criminals prior to a criminal act?6 Once the act occurs it presents particular challenges for the investigation. The catastrophic nature of the attack makes finding trace evidence difficult as much of it is destroyed or made inaccessible by the event itself. If evidence is available, the incident site often requires teams of highly qualified technicians to work for long periods before useful evidence is produced. Witnesses can also be problematic. While a positive investigative aspect of a terrorist act is outrage on the part of citizens enhancing their motivation to cooperate, the impact of an event that causes mass destruction kills those who were in the best position to see what happened. The flip side of outrage is fear. Fear of terrorist reprisal hampers cooperation. In the case of a crime scene outside the US the potential problem of an unfriendly population is also a factor.J7 Given the current frequency of attack, the US has no shortage of investigative skill. However investigative latitude is not always conducive to finding the criminal. The threat an act of terror produces and the outrage generated energizes authorities to get answers and to bring the guilty to justice. As a result the US expends a great deal of resources to conduct a successful investigation. The manpower alone on some of these cases is staggering. At one point in the embassy bombings in Africa up to 200 FBI agents alone were working the crime scenes.58
Not only is this approach reactive and resource intensive, but also it is inherently slow particularly in the case of terrorist attacks. Due to the very nature of terrorism and particularly catastrophic terrorism the process as described above with all the drawbacks takes a great deal 
TERRORISM AS AN ACT OF WAR -THE NATIONAL SECURITY PARADIGM
Determining an act of terror strictly as an act of war embraces the national security paradigm for forming a response. This paradigm is marked by an aggressive effort to gather information to ensure early identification of a threat, action to deter or decisively preempt the threat, and failing that retaliatory action to prevent or deter further threat action!'
The very term war invokes an emotional and even visceral response. Yet, since the end of the World War II, the war label is perhaps a dichotomy. After all we have not officially made a declaration of war since. We have conducted police actions, coalition operations under UN mandate, peace operations, and operations other than war. We even have responded to acts of aggression in response to Libya after the Berlin Disco bombing and to the attacks on our embassies in Africa, invoking our right of self defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. On the other hand, we loosely apply the term war and attribute it to any number of endeavors -the Cold War, the War on Drugs, the War on Poverty, and the War on Organized Crime.
So what does the label do for us? In one vain calling a terrorist attack an act of war seems to simplify the matter seemingly allowing us to destroy the attacker with whatever force can be brought to bear. At the same time the label complicates matters as the term lends credibility to the opponent or at least affords the individual combatants soldier status and protection in accordance with The Hague and Geneva Conventions. A declaration of war is an extreme measure not particularly conducive to good relations in this 21'' century world order.
And in the case of the terrorist threat it is not always clear as to whom we will declare war on.
Senator Tim Hutchinson, referring to the USS Cole during Congressional hearings on the matter, asked if the attack legally should be considered an act of war and hence provides greater latitude in our response. The senator went on to emphasize the need to have a swift and severe response to these acts -enough so as to deter!2 Certainly deterrence and the option to preempt is one of the strongest aspects of the national security paradigm. The process provides for diplomatic efforts to reduce the likelihood of attack and garner cooperation from other countries in our effort to combat the threat. Our intelligence community maintains a continuous effort to track all threats to the US ideally identifying them in enough time for us to act to deter or preempt. While one can argue whether we are doing enough we are still exercising these response options. The real difficulty arises when some form of military response is required.
In the past our responses have been reactive. As explained in the previous section our overt response typically follows the law enforcement paradigm. The terrorist threat is rarely clear and since a state of war does not exist when these attacks occur the question of whom we are going to defend ourselves against becomes problematic. Hence it is difficult to get away from the law enforcement paradigm. Short of an overt and plausible claim of responsibility or immediate knowledge of the identity of the attacker, whether a state or transnational, we still need at least some evidence to properly direct our response. In referring to the attack on the USS Cole, ~i c h a e l Glennon, a law professor from the University of California at Davis, states that evidence needed to warrant a military response is unclear. While Article 51 of the UN Charter allows for use of military force in self-defense it does not provide any international law that answers the question of how much evidence is enough. In the case of the Cole, Glennon's recommendation for President Clinton was to "insist upon evidence that is highly probative, but not necessarily beyond a reasonable doubt.63 In Ronald Reagan's attack on Libya in 1986 reference is made to incontrovertible evidence of Libya's complicity and in a 1993 lraqi plot to assassinate former President Bush, President Clinton sited compelling evidence from intelligence officials to justify cruise missile strikes on the headquarters of lraqi Intelligence."
So it appears that we cannot escape the law enforcement paradigm in most cases as determining responsibility is critical to the success of any response. The issue of how much evidence is needed remains and the difficulty in getting that evidence was discussed in the previous section.
The response picture gets cloudier when we consider preemptive action based on anticipatory self-defense addressed in customary international law. Preempting an attack is obviously preferred, but what constitutes justification for preemptive strikes if a state of war does not already exist. The evidence for such a response now is likely to come not from any investigative process under the law enforcement paradigm, but from intelligence sources directly part of the national security paradigm. Certainly we can justify a preemptory response if the attack is imminent, but we still lack measures of evidence to allow us to say we have enough. Must we have evidence of intent to attack coupled with evidence of a capability to attack? Do we need evidence that an attack is imminent and what constitutes imminent? Of course, if an actual state of war exists, hostilities continue until one side is completely destroyed or surrenders. Forceful response using lesser measures of evidence is fraught with disaster.
Poor or incomplete evidence could lead to striking targets that have no relation to the threat.
We must also consider the danger of being used by our enemies to strike at others falsely.
Using the legal conventions in the law of war complicates the war determination. War by definition is a matter between two or more states or "contracting powers". So a proven attack by a transnational organization, such as al Qaeda, is not by international standards an act of war.
Of course all transnational groups operate from one or more states, but the degree of influence and responsibility the state has is difficult to determine.
The discussion above highlights the utter complexity of the problem of combating Despite the disagreement over the value of the paradigm we have done relatively well.
The frequency and lethality of attacks in the past have been tolerable. Overall casualties in the 90s were less then in the 80s.~' We have not suffered great economic damage, the threat of terrorism is not a significant issue in the minds of the American public and confidence in all our institutions remains high and our standing as a world superpower is unchanged. We have maintained this status during our continuing efforts to combat terrorism without significantly eroding our civil liberties although admittedly there would be some argument over the significance of the changes made to date to thwart terrorism. All the response objectives introduced earlier have largely been met. The incontrovertible fact about the law enforcement paradigm is that while the degree of its success remains arguable, no expert has ruled out the need to be able to establish responsibility with evidence, all be it an undefined amount, to target preemptive or retaliatory military action.
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So what is the real issue regarding this question -act of war or criminal act? We have and will continue to use all elements of national power to counter the threat of terrorism. The debate can rage over the degree in which we pursue this effort, but we do do it. We have and will continue to respond to acts of terror forcefully when the situation allows by invoking Article 51 and using the evidence we have to justify the action (e.g. air strikes on Libya and cruise missile strikes on Osama bin laden and Iraq). We will certainly do the same if we have "compelling evidence' of an imminent attack. We will continue to do all of this within both the paradigms in a manner that meets our national security interests. Terrorism is a crime and whether we also call a certain terrorist attack an act of war without declaring war realistically has little affect on our response. We will execute whatever response is justified by the evidence and practical by the diplomatic and political situation. Simply we haven't formally declared these past acts as acts of war so why would we do it in the future?
The great dilemma we face is that it is one thing to respond with force to an attack, and yet another to parry or preempt an imminent attack. However, as the potential for catastrophic loss rises how long can we wait to preempt an attack, particularly if we are presented with an enemy who has displayed the intent and the capability to conduct such an attack? Retired Terrorism is and should remain. a crime, but this fact does not rule out a response paradigm that also considers a given threat an act of war. We must recognize that the stakes have risen and that waiting to respond to an imminent attack may expose the country in a way that threatens our very existence. Our ability to exercise our right of self-defense within the rule of law remains paramount. When faced with a transnational terror organization or a state supported group that has openly declared war on us and our allies, consummated that threat with a series of attacks, and has the ability to at least acquire weapons of mass destruction, then we must consider that a state of war in fact exists all be it in an unclassical sense. That state of war while not declared should trigger both covert and overt actions across the full spectrum of response options to eliminate the threat. The unorthodox nature of the threat requires further changes in the rule of law both domestically, and if possible internationally, to allow our law enforcement and national security assets the latitude to meet the threat on the most favorable ground possible.77
RECOMMENDATION
There have been scores of books, articles, studies, and commissions recommending what we should do to respond the national security challenges of the 21' ' century. I will try to limit my recommendations to those that more closely relate to the focus of the paper. The paper has shown that our priority of effort against catastrophic terror should be in the proactive spectrum to deter, detect, and preempt attack.
A new paradigm is needed, one that incorporates both the law enforcement and national security paradigms. A declaration of war provides a great deal of latitude to law enforcement and national security forces both domestically and internationally as they are responding within the rule of law to a national emergency. However, as stated there is little practicality in declaring war in the strategic environment of the 21' ' century. As we are not likely to declare war we must develop new domestic and international laws now to allow for the effective use of a full range of assets both at home and abroad to counter the threat of catastrophic attack before it happens.
I see these efforts in four areas. The first is the need for additional laws that criminalize acts of terror and prohibited weapons development by building on already existing laws against piracy, airplane hijacking, proliferation of WMD -to make many terrorist acts universal individual crimes. 78 The second area would allow victims of terror to be compensated by states that sponsor terrorism or by the transnational organization through civil legal action. Third is the development of emergency measures that could take effect when ordered by the president.
Such an order would essentially declare a national emergency and allow for previously determined increased latitude for law enforcement and military response such as the war exception in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance ~c t .~~ As an example such a measure would provide law enforcement with greater latitude in acquiring legal authorization for physical and electronic monitoring.80 The fourth and perhaps most controversial would be an executive or congressional declaration of a state of national emergency that would allow still greater law enforcement latitude over a greater period of time and approve use of force options by the military. If these contingency laws are worked now we can obtain wider acceptance and provide for checks and balances that uphold our liberties while still protecting us.
Then we must be prepared to initiate these measures sooner perhaps then we have in the past not only to assist in identifying our attacker after the fact or shortly before the attack, but instead to respond to a viable, standing threat continuously until the threat is destroyed.
Initiating a de facto state of war without declaring war. DOD's role would be unchanged other then maintaining the proper mix of special and conventional forces to assist when called. DOD
should not claim the lead role in this fight. The U.S. has a robust law enforcement structure that may warrant reorganization, but has the resources to do the job.8'
Much of what I recommend will not be swallowed easily. Holistically we must consider every response, every action for the negative and positive aspects it has. These are hard decisions. Whether we can prevent a catastrophic attack remains to be seen, after all according to the experts it is only a matter of time before it happens, but to take no action invites catastrophe and risks our national survival.
"The Romans so cherished their civilized image of themselves that it blinded them to the strengths of the barbarians, and Rome's greatest failure was its inability to understand the changing Our greatest strength -openness, civil liberties, and democratic ideals -is also the source of our greatest weakness. We must take caution that our civilized image of ourselves does not blind us. Therefore we must recognize the changing nature of what threatens us and work now to strike the proper balance that will allow us to maintain our national security and at the same time retain our national identity as a free and open society else we risk the faith of Rome.
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